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RECENT DECISIONS
Roth. While it does not resolve the problem courts in determining whether a material
of what is obscene, viz., hard core pornog- is obscene being firmly formulated, the
raphy, it does establish the test to be used courts can now concentrate on determining
in making such a determination. Thus, with that issue without first having to interpret
the criteria to be employed by the various the somewhat ambiguous Roth decision.
Recent Decision:
Narcotics Statute Ruled
Inapplicable to Religious
Use of Peyote
Three Navajo Indians were arrested
while practicing an ancient religious rite
involving the use of hallucination-produc-
ing peyote.' Upon appeal of their convic-
tion for the illegal possession of narcotics,
the defendants argued that the statutory
prohibition against the possession and use
of peyote contained in Section 11500 of
the California Health and Safety Code
abridged their constitutionally guaranteed
right to the free exercise of religion. The
state contended that Peyotism shackles the
Indians to primitive conditions and under-
mines enforcement of narcotics laws. Re-
versing the judgment of the superior court,
the California Supreme Court held that the
state's compelling interest in law enforce-
'Peyote is a product of the plant lophophora
williamsii, growing in small buttons on the spine-
less cactus indigenous to Texas and northern
Mexico. Mescaline, its principal constituent, re-
leases its effects when the buttons are chewed
or a derivative tea is consumed by the user. The
types of hallucinations produced vary from
bright-hued kaleidoscopic patterns to the symp-
tomatic visions of schizophrenia. The visual
effects are usually coupled with a heightened
sense of comprehension and friendliness toward
others. Technically peyote is not a narcotic, but
a non-addicting hallucinogen whose users suffer
no after effects when the hallucinatory stage has
passed. For further discussion, see N.Y. Times,
Nov. 1, 1964, § 6 (Magazine), p. 96.
ment was insufficient to outweigh the con-
stitutional guarantees of religious freedom
invoked by appellants as to their bona
fide use of peyote as a sacramental symbol.
People v. Woody, - Cal.-, 394 P.2d
813, 40 Cal. Rep. 69 (1964).
There is little consistency among the
cases interpreting the alleged infringement
of first amendment religious liberty by
state and federal statutes. A review of these
cases reveals not only disparity in the forms
of the religious practices involved but also
diversity in the approaches taken by the
courts in reaching these decisions.2
One of the leading cases in this field is
Sherbert v. Verner,3 in which the United
States Supreme Court held that a Seventh
Day Adventist was unconstitutionally de-
prived of the right to the free exercise of
2 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961),
in which the Court denied relief to Orthodox
Jewish merchants who sought relief from Penn-
sylvania's Sunday Closing Laws, holding that the
statute did not deprive appellants of their re-
ligion, but only made their religious observance
more expensive. Compare Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), in which the
Court granted relief to Jehovah's Witness school-
children whose religious refusal to pledge allegi-
ance to the flag violated a state regulation, with
State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash.
2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952), in which the court
denied religious exemption to a Christian Scien-
tist student who protested an X-ray examination
prerequisite to registration at the University of
Washington.
3 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
her religion when the state denied her claim
for unemployment benefits, despite her in-
ability to find employment that did not
require her to labor on Saturday, her
sabbath. Reasoning that the denial clearly
burdened the free exercise of appellant's
religion, the Court then considered whether
some compelling state interest justified
such abridgement of her constitutional
guarantees. Although the state contended
that fraudulent objections to Saturday work
would dilute the state compensation fund
and interfere with employers' scheduling of
Saturday work, the Court held that no
actual evidence of such abuse had been
presented by the state to justify the in-
fringement. Thus, the dual analysis em-
ployed in Sherbert called first for a deter-
mination if there was, in fact, a curtailment
of a first amendment right, and then a
weighing of the abridgement against the
state interests involved.
A case which concerned a more serious
peril to state interests was Reynolds v.
United States,4 which centered upon the
Mormon practice of polygamy. The appel-
lant was a Utah Mormon who protested
that his right to free religious exercise was
obstructed by a statute proscribing bigamy.
Acknowledging that religious beliefs can-
not be restrained by statute, the Court
held, nonetheless, that the law may consti-
tutionally proscribe deliberate acts, how-
ever piously motivated, which constitute a
grave threat to marriage, family and so-
ciety. Thus, the decision was founded on
so weighty a concern for public policy that
the consideration of first amendment rights
was necessarily limited.
Similarly, the courts have given heavy
emphasis to public safety and welfare in
4 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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the cases involving the handling of poison-
ous snakes as part of religious rituals. Kirk
v. Commonwealth5 set forth the elements
typically contained in cases of this kind.
The defendant was a licensed preacher of
a religious sect which handled rattlesnakes
as a test of faith, believing that no harm
would come to handlers sufficiently devout.
Appealing his conviction for the involun-
tary manslaughter of his wife who was
fatally bitten by a snake during a religious
ceremony, the preacher argued that the
statute which proscribed the practice of
snake-handling unconstitutionally abridged
his first amendment rights. Here, as in Rey-
nolds, the court conceded that the law may
not interfere with the espousal of the faith
itself, but in view of the public policy
issue involved it held that conscientious
religious belief was no excuse for illegal
acts endangering the lives and health of
citizens.
The unequivocal concern for public wel-
fare in these cases might suggest a similar
attitude toward the religious use of peyote,
but the states are not united in their treat-
ment of the drug. An interesting perspec-
tive of current policy regarding peyote is
found reflected in the laws of several West-
ern states where concentrations of Indian
believers in Peyotism reside. In 1960 rec-
5 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E.2d 409(1947); see Harden
v. State, 216 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1948); Lawson
v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972
(1943).
But public policy has been tempered by con-
cern for first amendment religious freedom even
in the vital area of national security, as evidenced
by the provisions of the Internal Security Act
of 1950, which exempted conscientious objectors
from combat service in the armed forces. See
Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389(1953);
Taffs v. United States, 208 F.2d 329 (8th Cir.
1953); In re Hansen, 148 F. Supp. 187 (D.
Minn. 1957).
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ognition was extended to the sacramental
use of peyote by judicial decree in the case
of Arizona v. Attakai.6 Similarly Montana
in 19577 and New Mexico in 19598
amended their narcotics statutes in order
to lift a pre-existing proscription of peyote
and permit its use for religious and sacra-
mental purposes.
In deciding the case at bar the Court
focused on the question of whether there
was a compelling state interest which
counter-balanced appellants' right to the
free exercise of their religion. Adopting the
reasoning utilized in Sherbert, the Court
employed a two-fold approach. First, it
determined whether there was, in fact, an
abridgement of constitutional rights, and
second, it weighed any such infringement
against the state's interest in continuing the
proscription of peyote as it existed hereto-
fore.
In order to determine whether the stat-
ute imposed any burden on the free exer-
cise of appellants' religion, the Court in-
quired into the tenets of the Native Amer-
ican Church to which appellants belong.
6 Criminal No. 4098, Coconino County, July 26,
1960.
7 MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-35-123 (Supp.
1963). The amendment provided that the pro-
hibition shall not apply to the use or possession
of peyote "for religious sacramental purposes
by any bona fide religious organization incorpo-
rated under the laws of the state of Montana."
(Emphasis added.) It is interesting to note the
requirement of corporate status as a qualification
for the exemption of the religious organization.
8 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-5-16 (1962). The
amendment is almost identical to the Montana
amendment supra.
9 Since the organization forbids the use of al-
cohol and embraces many Christian precepts,
a number of authorities believe that members of
the church observe higher standards than non-
members. Estimates of the organization's mem-
bership range from 30,000 to 250,000. It is in-
corporated under the laws of California.
The Court noted that the religion combined
certain Christian teachings with the belief
that "peyote embodies the Holy Spirit and
that those who partake of peyote enter into
direct contact with God." 10
Although peyote serves as a sacramental
symbol similar to bread and wine in cer-
tain Christian churches, it is more than a
sacrament. Peyote constitutes in itself an
object of worship; prayers are directed to
it much as prayers are devoted to the Holy
Ghost. On the other hand, to use peyote
for nonreligious purposes is sacrilegious.
Members of the church regard peyote also
as a "teacher" because it induces a feeling
of brotherhood with other members; in-
deed, it enables the participant to experi-
ence the Deity. Finally, devotees treat
peyote as a "protector." Much as a Cath-
olic carries his medallion, an Indian G.I.
often wears around his neck a beautifully
beaded pouch containing one large peyote
button.1
After an examination of the record, the
Court concluded that the effect of Section
11500 of the California Health and Safety
Code was a virtual prohibition of appel-
lants' religion. It stated that "to forbid the
use of peyote is to remove the theological
heart of peyotism. '"1 2
Having once concluded that an infringe-
ment did in fact exist, the Court passed to
the second step in order to determine
whether such abridgement was justified in
the light of the state's compelling interest.
This called for an analysis of the state's
contentions that Peyotism substitutes the
10 People v. Woody, - Cal. , , 394 P.2d
813, 817, 40 Cal. Rep. 69, 73 (1964).
11 Id. at -, 394 P.2d at 817-18, 40 Cal. Rep. at
73. Elsewhere in its opinion the Court noted the
significance of Title II, ch. 85, § 3 of the Na-
tional Prohibition Act (1919) which exempted
from prohibition the use of wine for sacramental
purposes.
12 d. at -, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rep. at 74.
use of the drug for proper medical care,
threatens to indoctrinate small children,
engenders a possible propensity to the use
of other more harmful drugs, and shackles
the Indians to primitive conditions.
The Court found these arguments un-
substantiated by the record. It noted the
absence of evidence to suggest that the
Indians employed peyote in place of proper
medical treatment, and observed from the
record that Indian children never used
peyote and that teenagers used it rarely.
Further, the Court cited the admission of
the attorney general that "there was no
evidence to suggest that Indians who use
peyote are more liable to become addicted
to other narcotics than non-peyote-using
Indians,"' 13 and "that peyote . . . works no
permanent deleterious injury to the In-
dian." 4 As to the shackling of the Indians
to primitive conditions, the Court admitted
of no doctrine that "the state in its asserted
omniscience, should undertake to deny to
defendants the observance of their religion
in order to free them from the suppositious
'shackles' of their 'unenlightened' and
'primitive condition'. '15
The Court then proceeded to examine
the state's contention that fraudulent as-
sertions of religious immunity would im-
pair enforcement of the narcotics laws.
Turning again to Sherbert, wherein a simi-
lar argument predicted the filing of fraud-
ulent unemployment compensation claims
by persons feigning religious objections to
Saturday labor, the Court pointed to the
lack of evidence warranting fear of spuri-
ous claims. It dismissed the state's conten-
tion that the continued sacramental use of
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
10 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1964
peyote would threaten the effective admin-
istration of the narcotics laws by noting un-
impaired enforcement of such laws in
Arizona, Montana, and New Mexico where
Peyotism is permitted.16
The state's next argument suggested the
difficulties that would necessarily attend
any inquiry into the bona fides of each
defendant's religious faith in future cases.
The Court responded on this point, relying
on United States v. Ballard,7 in which the
Supreme Court conceded that judicial ex-
amination of the truth or validity of reli-
gious beliefs is foreclosed by the first
amendment, but nonetheless concluded
that "the courts of necessity must ask
whether the claimant holds his belief
honestly and in good faith or whether he
seeks to wear the mantle of religious im-
munity merely as a cloak for illegal ac-
tivities." 18
Finally, the Reynolds case, upon which
the state principally relied, was examined
by the Court and distinguished on the
ground that it involved a lesser curtailment
of religious freedom than the case at bar,
and that it placed in issue a far greater
peril to the interest of the state. The Court
stated that
the test of constitutionality calls for an
examination of the degree of abridgement
of religious freedom involved in each case.
Polygamy, although a basic tenet in the
theology of Mormonism, is not essential to
the practice of the religion; peyote, on
1C Id. at -, 394 P.2d at 819, 40 Cal. Rep. at 75.
17 322 U.S. 78 (1944). The majority opinion in
this mail fraud case upheld the constitutional
propriety of probing the defendant's own belief
in his alleged religious healing powers. However,
the strong dissent of Mr. Justice Jackson should
be noted.
Is People v. Woody, supra note 10, at -, 394
P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rep. at 77.
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the other hand, is the sine qua non of de-
fendants' faith. It is the sole means by
which defendants are able to experience
their religion; without peyote defendants
cannot practice their faith. Second, the
degree of danger to state interests in Rey-
nolds far exceeded that in the instant case.
The Court in Reynolds considered polyg-
amy as a serious threat to democratic in-
stitutions and injurious to the morals and
well-being of its practitioners. As we have
heretofore indicated, no such compelling
state interest supports the prohibition of
the use of peyote. 19
In order to resolve this case, which
pitted vital interests of the state against
religious acts safeguarded by the first
amendment, the Court realized that it re-
quired a unique measuring device. It
searched for an implement of breadth upon
which such disparate values could be
juxtaposed; and yet it sought a finely grad-
uated instrument which could precisely
gauge the outcome when the contest might
be close. The Court found such a device
in its two-fold analysis. This simply in-
volved first, a determination whether the
religious liberties concerned were actually
infringed, and second, a conclusion
whether such infringement might justifiably
displace the warrantably heavy weight that
freedom of religion places upon the scales
of constitutionality. The logic and simplic-
19 Id. at -, 394 P.2d at 820, 40 Cal. Rep. at 76.
ity of this approach would seem to urge its
greater use in future cases wherein state
interest and religious practice clash. Fur-
thermore, the courts should welcome eager-
ly this test which offers aid in settling the
awesome issue of priority between the laws
of man and God.
However, one problem may confront the
courts attempting to apply this formula.
An inquiry into the bona fides of a defend-
ant's faith may be required, and this could
prove to be a challenge. Cases will, no
doubt, arise in which persons seeking reli-
gious immunity may feign their "faith" in
order to escape conviction for their illegal
acts. Other defendants who hold sincere
but strange beliefs may be mistaken for
impostors. Thus, the problem of determin-
ing the good faith of allegedly religious
practices may impose a difficult but not an
insurmountable task upon the courts.
Such a challenge can and should be met
wherever the sanctity of first amendment
freedom is placed in issue. The way is
pointed by the case at bar. This decision
properly upholds and reaffirms the prin-
ciples of free religious exercise. Having
thus stretched to new dimensions the de-
marcation line between state interest and
religious freedom, particularly in the area
of narcotics, this decision will doubtless
usher in a host of cases, some seeking ac-
commodation within the newly broadened
boundary lines, others pressing even further
to expand the gain.
